the liberal state expected by the European Union stands in contrast with one of the principal tenets of the ruling FIDESz/Christian Democrat (KDNP) coalition. At the same time, the current yearning for an illiberal state accords with a strand of desire more akin to those who supported Cardinal Mindszenty during the Revolution and by extension his sympathy for the authoritarian regime of Miklós Horthy.
The collapse of communist power in 1989 Hungary was marked by both an unstable economy and an undermining of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party's (Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt, MSzMP) legitimacy. This was on full display at the funeral of Imre Nagy on 16 June. The demand for the recovery of his body and the funeral 2 The historian David W. Blight explains how the crushing defeat of the Confederacy was transformed into a glorious and heroic event in order to create an atmosphere that could lead to national reunion. These narratives almost always leave out the more complex and painful details of the story and the Lost Cause narrative that stemmed from the American Civil War largely ignored slavery as its source and supported the politics of the Jim Crow south (Blight, 2001 ). The Hungarian Revolution was transformed from a story of failure to one of heroism and moral victory over the oppression of the Soviet State.
broadened into a re-evaluation of the Revolution. At Nagy's reburial Tibor Méray eulogized, "If you are without guilt then those that sent you to the gallows are murderers.
Let their punishment be the contempt of the nation…the nations of the world know that this funeral was not a gift of the regime, but won by the people" (Méray, 1989; Kis, 1995: 45; Benziger, 2008: 26-29) . As historians such as András Bozoki and Rudolf L. Tőkés have shown, the negotiations that led to the establishment of the Republic demonstrated the many fractures within the opposition, but it is telling that the Hungarian people rejected MSzMP hegemony overwhelmingly in a referendum that stripped them of their power in November that same year (Tőkés, 1996; Bozóki, 2002) . The bitter truth that many Hungarians knew, but could not publically express, now became institutionalized by the First Act of Parliament 1990 which proclaimed that the 1956 Revolution was a War of Independence. What seemed like a triumph, however, almost immediately began to sow the seeds of acrimony. The original draft of the bill had included Nagy's name as the symbolic head of the Revolution. It also named the perpetrators of the terror that followed. In a last-minute maneuver, the names were removed, and hostility and mistrust between the MDF and the center-left deepened. For some, Nagy's communist past was unpalatable, and others worried about linkages with the communist past that might damn their political careers, revealing the uneasiness that many felt regarding the complexity of the politics surrounding the Revolution (Benziger, 2008: 118) .
The inability of the MDF to right the economy and the loss of one million jobs lead many Hungarians to yearn for the years under János Kádár and its social security system that had raised many Hungarian's standard of living, albeit in comparison to other countries under Soviet sway. The Socialist Party (MSzP) that had been formed from the MSzMP in the Fall of 1989 now saw its fortunes reversed and came to power in coalition with the SzDSz in 1994 (Szamuely, 1996: 67; Rácz, 2003: 446) . The legacy of the Revolution loomed large, and personages at odds with each other in 1956 were now joined in an uncomfortable marriage featuring those whose legacy included a role in the suppression of the Revolution and the consolidation of the People's Republic under Kádár and former revolutionaries. What made this a most bitter pill to swallow was the Socialist Party's bid to co-opt Nagy's legacy through a memorial bill. In this way they would seek to redress the insult perpetrated by the removal of Nagy's name in the First Act of Parliament and further legitimize their political standing through linkage to a revolutionary martyr. The bitter debate that ensued ensured the many factional interpretations of the Revolution and Nagy were enshrined in the minutes of parliament.
The center-right parties asserted that Nagy was a follower of events and therefore should be memorialized in concert along with all of the other revolutionary martyrs. Ottó Sándorffy of the Smallholders Party claimed that Nagy "…knew his communist comrades would never forgive his desire to remain Hungarian…[he] would never have wanted to be separated from his companions who fought by his side." He then proceeded to read the names of those who had been killed during Kádár's reign of terror that followed the Revolution into the minutes of parliament forcing all members to stand out of respect for the dead (Sándorffy, 1997) . With the Socialists holding a majority in parliament, the bill officially naming Nagy a vertanu (blood witness) passed, but for a brief moment the coalition that had toppled the MSzMP in 1989 was brought together including most of the members of the MSzP coalition partner SzDSz (Benziger, 2008: 119-126) . Minister under János Kádár, who is portrayed living happily in his village convinced that he had served his country through his role in the terror (Novák, 2010) . In the absence of substantive legal proceedings against those responsible for the many crimes committed during the demobilization of the revolution, there was no mechanism to re-examine grievances in a way that permitted some kind of national atonement and forgiveness (Benziger, 2008:158) . In this frenzied atmosphere, FIDESz held a countercommemoration on 23 October, the day the Revolution began in 1956, which dwarfed the official commemorations. Viktor Orbán ripped into the Socialists "…they [the Socialists] took away the right of free elections…it happened in a country twice tormented by the greatest lie of the twentieth century, Socialism!" (quoted in Benziger, 2008: 159-162 ). Orbán's call for a second revolution resonated with the polity, and the government's calls for austerity played into his hands. As Paul Lendvai asserts, government plans for the reform of health care and higher education that included higher fees were rejected in a 2008 referendum by 82% of those voting (Lendvai, 2012: 198) . In 2010, the Hungarian Vági, Csősz, Kádár, 2013: 361-363; Népszabadság, 2014: 1; Miklós, 2015) .
